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INCOME AND EXCLUSIONS FROM INCOME
CLYDE N. RANDALL of the Utah Bar; C.P.A., Utaht
The subject assigned to me, "Income and Exclusions from
Income," was outlined to include roughly those sections in the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 from 61 to 120, except those dealing
with insurance, annuities, and capital contributions to corporations,
which materially changed the former law as it existed in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as amended.
GROSS INCOME
At the outset, probably only a few words on the general con-
cept of income will be sufficient, leaving our major concern to
those exclusions from gross income provided by the new statute.
First, the concept of gross income, the beginning point in the
determination of tax liability, is defined in Section 61 of the new
code. While the language is somewhat similar to Section 22 (a) of
the old code, it is rearranged. The new Code Section 61 states,
"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income, from whatever source derived, including (but not lim-
ited to) the following items." Notice the language, "income from
whatever source derived" used in the new code has been lifted
verbatim from the Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. This was not the case with Section 22 (a) of the old code.
It would appear that whatever controversy may have existed as
to whether or not the concept of gross income used in the old code,
which had basicly remained unchanged since 1913, was as broad
as the term "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, has
now been removed. It would appear that the intent of Congress
in Section 61 of the new code was to make the concept of gross
income, except for the statutory exclusions, as broad as constitu-
tionally taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment. But this
somewhat theoretical change does not affect the basic concept of
gross income. It is still the same dynamic concept it was under the
old code, limited by the same judicial decisions and administrative
rulings as to recovery of capital, severance, realization, legality,
etc.
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS
The material changes made by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 are not in the basic concept of gross income itself but in the
specific statutory inclusions and exclusions which the Congress has
chosen on public policy grounds to include or exclude from gross
income. These warrant detailed consideration.
ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS
As you recall, the old law, Section 22(k), provided that pe-
riodic payments made under a decree of divorce or separate main-
tActing Dean of College of Business, Head of Accounting Department, Pro-
fessor of Accounting, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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tenance or under a written instrument incident thereto was in-
cludable in the gross income of the wife. Installment payments
discharging a part of an obligation, the principal sum of which is,
in terms of money or property, specified in the decree, shall be con-
sidered periodic payments if such principal sum may be paid with-
in a period ending more than ten years from the date of the decree.
The new law makes two changes broadening this rule. First, Sec-
tion 71 (a) (2) provides that where husband and wife are separated,
not under a court decree, periodic payments made under a written
separation agreement, executed after August 16, 1954, and based
on the marital relationship, shall be income to the wife provided
husband and wife do not file a joint return. The second change in
Section 71 (a) (3) provides that where the wife is separated from
her husand, periodic payments received by the wife after August
16, 1954, under a decree entered after March 1, .1954, requiring
payments for support or maintenance, shall be includable in the
gross income of the wife providing no joint return is filed. This
latter provision will apparently cover all temporary alimony and
support decrees granted under statute, permitting temporary sup-
port and maintenance during the divorce proceedings. It will also
probably include periodic payments made under an interlocutory
decree where the decree does not become final for a statutory period
of time.
Payments made for support of minor children are still, as
under the old law, not includable in the gross income of the wife,
and the first payments made by the husband are considered to apply
first toward the support of the children.
PRIZES, AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
Sections 74, 102 and 117 are related sections referring to gifts,
scholarships, prizes and awards. Section 102 is a re-enactment of
the exclusion of income from gifts, bequests, devises and inheri-
tances. Sections 74 and 117 are new and to an extent qualify the
gift rule. Section 74 (a) lays down the general rule that, except as
provided in Section 117, gross income includes amounts received
as prizes and awards. This is apparently intended to catch all com-
mercial prizes not coming under the exception in Section 74 (b). It
does not appear to require a lack of donative intent on the part of
the giver, nor does it appear to require a lack of consideration, a
lack of "something" passing from the receiver either to the giver
or to a third party as in the Washburn case 1 where the Tax Court
relied on the fact that the recipient had employed no capital, con-
tributed no labor, made no wager, and did not become involved in
any future obligations.
The exception to this general rule is then provided in Section
74(b). Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes
and awards given in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific,
IWashburn v. Commissioner, 5 TC 1333.
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educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if (1)
the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter
the contest, and (2) the recipient is not required to render sub-
stantial future services as a condition. What constitutes action on
the recipient's part to enter the contest? Does filing an entry blank
make the prize taxable? Also, what constitutes rendering substan-
tial future services? Is appearing on a program sufficient? Appar-
ently either one of these acts on the part of the recipient would
make the prize taxable.
Apparently this section is a partial codification of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Robertson v. United
States,2 where the Court looked at the acceptance by the contestants
of the offer tendered by the sponsor as the creation of an enforce-
able contract discharged by the rendering of services.
Section 116 takes out of the category of prizes, amounts re-
ceived as scholarships and fellowships at educational institutions,
as well as services and accommodations supplied such as room and
board and amounts received and used to cover travel, research,
clerical help, or equipment which are incident to such scholarship
or fellowship.
If the student is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution, Section 117(b) (1) states such grants are excludable
from gross income to the extent that no services are required other
than those ordinarily required of all candidates for the degree.
If the student or fellow is not a candidate for a degree, Section
117 (b) (2) provides no exclusion unless the grantor is a tax exempt
organization under Section 501 (a) or a governmental unit, and
then the exclusion is limited to $300 times the number of months
the grant is received up to a maximum of thirty-six months. Sec-
tion 117 (b) (2) on non-degree students, makes no reference as to
whether services are rendered or not. Apparently, however, if
services were required, the grant would be included in gross in-
come under the general provisions on compensation.
COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS
Sections 104, 105 and 106 provide a series of changes regard-
ing employee accident and sickness benefits. Under the old law,
amounts received as accident or health benefits under employer
pension plans were exempt if paid under a contract of insurance
but were taxable if paid under non-insured plans. The new law
places all plans financed by the employer on a parity, whether in-
sured or self-insured.
The rule under the new law is that amounts received from an
employer by an employee through accident or health insurance for
personal injuries or sickness generally are taxable to the extent




includable in the gross income of the employee or if paid directly
by the employer. But then three exceptions are made which take
most of the cases out of the general rule and make such payments
received by the employee non-taxable. The first exception applies if
received directly or indirectly by the taxpayer to reimburse him for
expenses he incurred for medical care of himself, his spouse or his
dependents which were not taken as a medical deduction under Sec-
tion 213 for a prior year. Under the tax benefit rule, amounts de-
ducted in a prior year for medical expenses from which a tax benefit
was received must be included in the gross income of the employee
in the years received. The second exception includes amounts re-
ceived by the employee for loss of a member, function or disfigure-
ment of the body and computed with reference to the nature of the
injury and not in relation to the time absent from work. The third
includes amounts received in lieu of wages, not exceeding $100 per
week paid due to absence from work due to injuries or sickness,
after the first seven calendar days of absence or the full period if
the employee was hospitalized at least one day on account of such
injury or sickness.
In each of these three exceptions the amounts received by the
employee would be excluded from gross income, whether paid as
a result of an insurance contract, direct by the employer, or under
a sickness and disability fund for employees maintained under the
laws of a state or territory.
Section 106 now provides by statute in broad language that
gross income of the employee does not include contributions made
by the employer to an accident and health plan, whether made
directly to the employee or by way of insurance premiums or
whether made for one or many employees. This differs consider-
ably from the law prior to the enactment of this section when only
premiums paid by the employer on group health and hospitaliza-
tion policies were excluded from gross income of the employee by
administrative ruling.
RENTAL VALUE OF PARSONAGE
Section 107 is an expansion of Section 22(b) (6) of the old
code which provided for exclusion from gross income of the rental
value of a dwelling furnished a minister of the gospel. The new
code expands this to include a rental allowance paid in cash if used
to rent or provide a home.
INCOME FROM DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS
Section 108 carries forward, and expands, the exception pro-
vided in the old code in Section 22(b) (9) to the rule that gain must
be recognized upon the non-gratuitious discharge of indebtedness
for less than its tax basis to the extent the taxpayer is solvent
after the discharge. The section has no bearing on those situations
coming under the American Dental Company decision:' where there
I Helvering v. American Dental Company, 318 U.S. 322.
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are direct negotiations between debtor and creditor and a gratui-
tious cancellation of the debt containing donative intent, lack of
consideration and the other elements for a valid gift. In such cases
no gain need be included in gross income. Section 108 does provide
an exception for those cases coming under the Kirby Lumber Com-
pany rule 4 where the elements of a valid gift are not present and
the debtor is solvent after the discharge. It permits the debtor to
exclude the gain from gross income to the extent that he reduces
the tax basis of certain property. It is based on the logical theory
that where a taxpayer is able to discharge his obligations for less
than their face value it is evidence of a decline in the value of his
property which is the security for his debts rather than evidence
of a taxable increase in his net worth. Under Section 22 (b) (9) of
the old law the exception was limited to debts of a corporation
evidenced by a security. Section 108 of the new law is broadened
to include all indebtedness of a corporation and indebtedness in-
curred or assumed by an individual in connection with property
used in his trade or business. The phrase used in case of an in-
dividual "in connection with property used in his trade or busi-
ness" will require some interpretation. Apparently there must be
some relationship between the indebtedness of the individual and
the property of the individual used in his trade or business. The
Report of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate
in discussing this section uses the phrase "in connection with the
acquisition of property used in his trade or business."'5 This term
"acquisition," would further narrow the indebtedness qualifying
under the statute.
For.a discharge of indebtedness which does qualify under the
statute, the taxpayer may elect to exclude such gain from gross in-
come by filing a consent, to the regulations prescribed under Sec-
tion 1017, to have the amount excluded from gross income applied
in the reduction of the basis of any property held (whether before
or after the time of the discharge) by the taxpayer during any por-
tion of the taxable year in which the discharge occurred. The re-
duction shall be made as of the first day of the taxable year or as of
the date of acquisition if acquired during the year. While no regu-
lations have been issued on this section yet, Regulations 118, in-
terpreting similar language in the old code, stated that the re-
duction of basis of the assets was to be made in the following or-
der: (1) any specific property, whether or not subject to a pur-
chase money lien, if the indebtedness was incurred to purchase that
property; (2) any property (except inventory or notes and accounts
receivable) against which there was a lien other than a purchase
money lien; (3) all other property except inventory and receiv-
ables; (4) inventory and notes and accounts receivableA
4 United States v. Kirby Lumber Company, 294 U.S. 1.
5Report of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate to ac-
company H. R. 8300, p. 186.
0 Stanley and Kilcullen, The Federal Income Tax, 1954 Code Edition,
Pamphlet No. 1, p. 60.
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INCOME TAXES PAID BY LESSEE
Section 110 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for
a rather narrow exception to a general rule of income taxation
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1929.
While the statutory exception itself is relatively unimportant, the
fact that it became necessary for the Congress to grant special
relief is of importance to tax practitioners. In Old Colony Trust
Company v. Commissioner,7 the United States Supreme Court held
that where there is a contractual agreement to receive income which
includes a promise by the payor to also pay the federal income tax
of the recipient on such income, the payment of the tax for the re-
cipient constitutes additional taxable income. This means for a
cash basis taxpayer that each year as the subsequent tax is paid,
it would become additional taxable income and could continue on
chronologically indefinitely if the contract were so interpreted un-
der the law of the state in which it was executed. If the recipient
of the income were reporting on the accrual basis, the Supreme
Court of the United States and the lower courts have apparently
approved the pyramiding of the tax. The formula for the compu-
tation of such a tax would be the amount of income originally paid
divided by 100 per cent minus the effective rate of tax. For ex-
ample, the tax on $1,000 of original income, if the recipient were
in the 20 per cent bracket, would be [1,000 - (100 - 20)] -
1,000, or $250. If the recipient were in a bracket where the effec-
tive rate of tax was 80 per cent, the pyramided tax on the original
$1,000 of income would be $4,000. As the effective rate of the tax
approaches 100 per cent, the tax on the original income will ap-
proach infinity. Section 110 provides special relief in certain cases
where a lease was entered into before January 1, 1954. If both
lessee and lessor are corporations and, under the lease, the lessee
is obligated to pay or to reimburse the lessor for any part of the
income tax imposed upon the lessor with respect to the rentals,
then such payments for the tax are excludable from the gross in-
come of the lessor and are not deductible by the lessee. The moral
to Section 110 is to avoid any contract which contains a promise
to pay the federal tax on certain income payments. The Congress
may not be so benevolent in granting relief by special legislation in
your case.
COMBAT PAY OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES
Section 112 re-enacts and extends the provisions of the old code
Section 22(b) (13) regarding combat pay of members of the armed
forces. Briefly, the provision excludes from gross income the
monthly compensation of an enlisted man and the first $200 per
month of a commissioned officer for any month during any part of
which the taxpayer served in a combat zone or was hospitalized
as a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred while serving in
7 279 U.S. 716.
DICTA
March, 1955
a combat zone. As you recall, the President of the United States,
under the power granted him by this section, declared Korea and
adjacent waters a combat zone by executive order. This exclusion
provision, which would, under the old code, have expired December
31, 1954, is extended under Section 112 to cover any induction
period under present or future draft legislation.
Section 692 likewise extends the forgiveness features of old
Section 154 which would have expired January 1, 1955, to cover any
individual who dies during any induction period while in active
service in the armed forces in a combat zone or as a result of
wounds, disease, or injury incurred while so serving. His tax for
the year of death and any prior taxable year ending on or after the
first day he so served in a combat zone after June 24, 1950, are
forgiven. Also any prior years' taxes unpaid at the date of such
death are cancelled.
DIVIDEND EXCLUSIONS AND CREDITS
Section 116 contains the new provision for the partial ex-
clusion from gross income of dividends received by an individual. Its
companion measure, Section 34, provides a credit against the tax
based on dividends received by individuals. These two provisions
are a step in the direction of granting relief from double taxation
where income is received by an individual from a corporation where
the income has already been taxed against the corporate entity.
Both sections apply only to taxable years ending after July 31, 1954.
The credit provided in Section 34 is 4 per cent of the dividends
received after July 31, 1954, from domestic corporations and in-
cluded in gross income. Notice it applies only to dividends re-
ceived after July 31, 1954. There are two further limitations as
to the amount of such calculation which can be deducted. The
credit cannot exceed the tax as calculated less the foreign tax
credit. The tax cannot be reduced below zero. It also cannot ex-
ceed 2 per cent of taxable income for taxable years ending before
January 1, 1955, or 4 per cent of taxable income for years ending
after December 31, 1954.
Section 116 provides for an exclusion from gross income of an
individual of dividends up to $50 and shall apply to the dividends
first received in such year.
In case of a joint return, if each spouse owns in his or her
own name stocks producing dividends of $50 each, a $100 exclusion
is permitted. If the stocks are held in joint tenancy, the answer
is not clear whether $50 or $100 can be excluded, but there is some
precedent in the administrative holding that in case of partially
tax exempt bonds held in joint tenancy interest on principal in
the amount of $10,000 can be excluded on a joint return for doub-
ling the $50 exclusion. There is also an argument for excluding
$100 in those cases where under state law of a transfer in joint
tenancy, it cannot be shown that the grantor did not part with the
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beneficial title, dominion and control, and that he can revert the
beneficial title to the whole of the property to himself.
Neither the credit under Section 34 nor the exclusion under
Section 116 is allowed to non-resident aliens taxed under Section
871(a) (not engaged in business in the United States and gross
income of not more than $15,400). The credit under Section 34
is not available to a taxpayer who files form 1040A (Section
6014 (a)) but is apparently available to an individual filing the
short form. The exclusion is apparently available in either case.
The term "dividends" used in both sections refers to dividends
from domestic corporations and implies dividends as defined in
Section 316. The intent of the statute is to allow the benefit only
in those cases where the income has been previously subject to the
corporate tax. Certain types of dividends are specifically disquali-
fied from the benefit by statute due to the type of corporation mak-
ing the distribution (Section 34(c) and 116(b)). Falling in this
category are life insurance companies, China Trade Act corpora-
tions, exempt charitable organizations, exempt farmers' coopera-
tive associations, and corporations engaged in business with pos-
sessions of the United States.
Further limitations on dividends which may qualify are those
implied in Section 316, that the distribution be out of earnings and
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or out of earnings
and profits of the taxable year. Thus, any distribution represent-
ing a return of capital would not qualify, even though it might
exceed the taxpayer's basis and be taxable as capital gain. For the
ordinary corporation, a distribution out of capital gains to the
corporation would qualify. In case of a regulated invested com-
pany, capital gains returned to shareholders as dividends do not
qualify; earnings' dividends do qualify, subject to limitations pro-
vided in Section 854.
One other point, if the stock is owned by a partnership, Section
702 (a) (5) provides that each partner shall take into account sep-
arately his distributive share of the partnership's qualifying divi-
dends received both for the credit under Section 34 and the ex-
clusions under Section 116. In other words, the benefits are not
lost where the income is funneled through a partnership.
Likewise, in case of an estate or trust, Section 642 (a) (3) pro-
vides that both the benefit of the credit and the exclusion will apply
to both the fiduciary or the beneficiaries, depending on whether the
income was distributed or distributable.
MEALS AND LODGING FURNISHED FOR CONVENIENCE OF EMPLOYER
The last new sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
which I was asked to cover are 119 and 120, relating to meals or
lodging furnished an employee. The general rule still applies that
meals and lodging furnished an employee by his employer are a
form of income in kind and includable in gross income. Section
119 now codifies, with some changes, the exception to this general
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rule laid down by both judicial decisions and administrative rul-
ings, that where the meals and/or lodging were furnished for the
convenience of the employer, their value was excludable from gross
income. But under the new code, the meals must be furnished on
business premises of the employer; and in case of lodging, the
employee is required to accept such lodging on the business prem-
ises of this employer. In one respect the new code is a broadening
of the convenience of the employer rule. Under the old rulings,
the convenience of the employer test was applied to determine
whether or not the item was income or compensation at all; under
the new code, it is an exclusion. If the parties had agreed by con-
tract that the meals and/or lodging were a part of the compensa-
tion, that was final. Under Section 118, even though the meals and
lodging are made part of compensation by "the provisions of an
employment contract or of state statute fixing terms of employ-
ment," the value thereof may still be excluded from gross income
specifically by the new code.
However, the old test as to what constitutes "for the conven-
ience of the employer" will apparently still apply. The furnishing
of meals and lodging must be essential to the performance of the
employment, with the major benefit therefrom accruing to the
employer and only an incidental benefit running to the employee.
In other words, not all meals and lodging furnished on the premises
are non-taxable to the employee under the new code.
Section 120, which is new, provides for the exclusion of a statu-
tory subsistence allowance not exceeding $5 per day received by a
police officer of a state, territory, or local government. Amounts
excluded under this provision cannot be deducted as expenses, ex-
cept insofar as the expenses exceed the allowance.
SITUATION WANTED
Young (26) attorney, presently practicing in
Chicago, desires association with a Denver law firm.
Illinois graduate, member of Illinois and Michigan
Bars. Address all inquiries to Box 11, 525 Mile High
Center, Denver 2, Colorado.
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